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HOW IT ALL STARTED - AND HOW IT ENDED: A
LEGAL STUDY OF THE KOREAN WAR
Howard S. Levie

A. World War II
Before taking up the basic subject of the discussion which follows, it
would appear appropriate to ascertain just what events led to the creation of
two such disparate independent nations as the Republic of Korea
(hereinafter referred to as South Korea) and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as North Korea) out of what had
been a united territory for centuries, whether independent or as the
possession of a more powerful neighbor, Japan — and the background of
how the hostilities were initiated in Korea in June 1950.
In the Cairo Declaration, signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang
Kai-Shek on December 1, 1943, the following statement appears, “The
aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and
independent.”1
On July 26, 1945, in the Potsdam Declaration, the same parties agreed
that the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be carried out;2 and in its
declaration of war against Japan, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union
joined in the Potsdam Declaration.3
Although as early as July 1945 Japan had sought to bring the war in
the Pacific to a negotiated end through the mediation of the then neutral
Soviet Union, the Soviet Government had refused to pass on messages to
that effect to Japan’s enemies. (The Soviet Union had agreed with its
Allies in the European war that it would enter the war against Japan as
1. The Cairo Declaration, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858 (1969) [hereinafter Bevans]; THE UNITED
STATES AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM, S. DOC. NO. 83-74, at 1 (1953) [hereinafter S. DOC. NO. 83-74].
2. Bevans, supra note 1, at 1205; S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 1.
3. The relevant part of the Soviet statement reads as follows: “True to its obligation as an Ally, the
Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied
powers of July 26.” S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 2.
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soon as Hitler was overthrown and it did not want the war in the Far East to
end without it being able to share in the spoils — in this case, among other
things, the Kurile Islands!) Then on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Foreign
Commissar advised the Japanese Ambassador that as of August 9th a state
of war would exist between the two nations.4 On August 10th Japan
offered to surrender, conditioned solely on the continuance of the Emperor
on the throne.5
A somewhat different history of the events of the period will be found
in the semi-official book Liberation Mission, edited by Marshal of the
Soviet Union A.A. Grechko and written by Major-General I.U. Parotkin
and a dozen other senior officers of the Soviet Army.6 Chapter XI, written
by Colonel G.K. Plotnikov, states that “Korea was liberated by the twentyfifth Army of the First Far Eastern Front, Soviet marine units and the
Pacific Fleet warships.”7 This completely ignores the fact that Japan had
attempted to negotiate an end of the war in July 1945 and had actually
offered to surrender on August 10th of that year! He is subsequently
somewhat less dogmatic, stating:
“By capturing the town and port of Seishan [on August 14], the Soviet
troops disrupted the Kwantung Army’s supply routes with Japan and
considerably expedited the surrender of the Japanese forces and the end of
the war in the Far East.”8
However, once again he is taking credit for the Japanese surrender
based on actions taken by the Soviet Union on August 14, 1945 when the
Japanese had offered to surrender four days earlier.
B. The Division of Korea
The United States Secretary of War drafted what became known as
General Order No. 1. A provision of that Order with respect to Korea
provided that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to
the Soviet military commander, while those south of that line would
surrender to the American military commander. The General Order, with
this provision, was sent to Moscow and to London and neither Government
made any objection to the provision with respect to the proposed military

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. LIBERATION MISSION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (A.A.
Grechko, ed., Progress Publishers 1975).
7. Id. at 402
8. Id. at 405 (emphasis added:) This occurred on August 17, 1945, a week after the Japanese
offer to surrender.
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actions in Korea.9 It is obvious that there was no intention on the part of
any of the persons involved that this Order should be construed as
constituting a political division of the country.10 As a matter of fact, at a
meeting held in Moscow in December 1945 the Foreign Ministers of Great
Britain and the Soviet Union and the Secretary of State of the United States
reached an agreement, to which the Government of China concurred, that a
provisional democratic Korean government should be established for
Korea in its entirety. Moreover, it was also agreed that the United States
and the Soviet Union would form a Joint Commission composed of
representatives of the United States Command in southern Korea and
representatives of the Soviet Command in northern Korea which, after
consultation with Korean “democratic parties and social organizations,”
would make recommendations with respect to a provisional Korean
government. These recommendations were to be submitted to a FourPower conference to be held in Moscow and would establish a Four-Power
trusteeship which would operate for a period of up to five (5) years. A
meeting of the military commanders of the two occupying Powers, for the
purpose of solving urgent administrative and economic problems, would
take place within two weeks.11 At that meeting of the military
commanders, which took place in January and February 1946, the United
States Command attempted to end the division at the 38th parallel but
completely failed to accomplish its major purpose as the Soviet
commander, General Terenty F. Shtykov (subsequently the Soviet
Ambassador to North Korea) insisted that plans for the organization of a

9. S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 2-3.
10. General MacArthur, as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, issued
General Order No. 1 on September 7, 1945. It provided in part as follows:
By the terms of the instrument of surrender, signed by command and in behalf of the
Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government and by command and in behalf of the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the victorious military forces of my command
will today occupy the territory of Korea south of 38° north latitude.
Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination
that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are
assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of surrender and
to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes,
your active aid and compliance are required.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief, United States Army
Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38° north latitude
and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions of the occupation:
All powers of Government over the territory of Korea south of 38° north latitude and the
people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority.
Id. at 3; BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KOREA, H.R. REP. NO. 81-2495, at 3-4 (1950) [hereinafter
H.R. REP. NO. 81-2495].
11. H.R. REP. NO. 81-2495, supra note 10, at 4; S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 4.
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single provisional Korean government were beyond the competence of the
military conference.12 This disregarded the fact that the Four-Power
meeting had specifically stated that the military commanders, at their
meeting, “would make recommendations with respect to a provisional
Korean government.” There can be no question but that the Soviet military
command arbitrarily interpreted the 38th parallel “as creating a permanent
delineation between two military zones, passage through which was
possible only by permission of the military commander.”13
When the Joint Commission met in Seoul in March 1946 the Soviet
delegation took the position that the Commission should consult only those
Korean organizations which had supported the Moscow trusteeship
agreement. As many Koreans and Korean organizations in South Korea
had expressed opposition to the trusteeship idea, which appeared to them to
closely resemble the protectorate exercised by Japan over Korea earlier in
the century, this would have disqualified all but the Communist
organizations. These latter had also originally opposed the trusteeship
plan, but later, pursuant to instructions from Pyongyang, had refrained
from criticizing the trusteeship idea and had supported it.14. As the United
States insisted that the Koreans could exercise the right to express their
opinions, and that even organizations which had objected to the trusteeship
plan were entitled to be heard, the conference of the Joint Commission
adjourned without having accomplished its purpose.15
The Joint
Commission met again in May 1947 but was no more successful in
reaching an agreement on Korean participation than it had been in 1946.
Unable to reach any agreement with the Soviet Union, the United
States referred the matter to the United Nations and on November 14, 1947
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution
establishing the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
(UNTCOK).16 Operative paragraph 2 of that Resolution provided:
12. Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 provided:
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional
Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out
measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social
progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the
establishment of the national independence of Korea.
S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 4.
13. THE DEP’T OF STATE, KOREA: 1945 TO 1948 3 [hereinafter KOREA: 1945 TO 1948].
14. KOON WOO NAM, THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP: 1945 TO 1965 (Univ. of
Alabama 1974) [hereinafter Koon Woo Nam].
15. Id. at 73-74.
16. S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 11-12. The United Nations named Australia, Canada,
China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as the
members of the Commission. Id. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic immediately stated that it
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2. Recommends that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948
on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose
representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the
prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean
people and which representatives, constituting a National Assembly,
may establish a National Government of Korea. The number of
representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate
to the population, and the elections should be under the observation of
the Commission.17

The Resolution also provided for the establishment of Korean military
forces and for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the occupying Powers.
The Soviet Union took the position that the problem of Korea did not fall
within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Thus, when the United
Nations conducted elections in Korea under the auspices of that
organization and pursuant to that Resolution, North Korea refused to
permit United Nations personnel to enter its territory. Subsequently, after
the United Nations-supervised election in South Korea, it conducted its
own unsupervised elections.
These unsupervised elections, not
surprisingly, resulted in the election as its President of the Russian-trained
Communist leader, Kim Il Sung, who retained that position for almost fifty
(50) years and who, on his death, was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il!18
On December 12, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations
took notice of the election in South Korea; declared that a lawful
government, the Republic of Korea, had been established; recommended
the withdrawal of occupying forces and; established a new United Nations
Commission on Korea (UNCOK) with numerous functions intended to end
the division of the country.19 According to one author:
would not participate in the work of the Commission.
17. KOREA: 1945 TO 1948, supra note 13, at 67.
18. Strange to relate, on 2 October 1950, probably due to the then status of the hostilities and the
impending crossing of the 38th parallel by UNC troops, the Communists relented and Soviet Foreign
Minister Vyshinsky introduced a resolution in the General Assembly that called for an immediate
cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, all-Korean elections of a National
Assembly under the observation of a United Nations Commission which was to include representatives
of states bordering on Korea [this meant the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of China],
economic assistance, and admission of the new Korean Government to membership in the United
Nation. ALLEN S. WHITING, CHINA CROSSES THE YALU: THE DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR
(Stanford Univ. Press 1960) [hereinafter Project Rand].
19. S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 23-26. The United Nations Commission on Korea
(UNCOK) consisted of representatives of the same nations that had constituted the previous Commission
except the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which had refused to serve on the earlier Commission,
was omitted. Id. In a speech delivered in May 1950, prior to the initiation of hostilities, Kim Il Sung, the
North Korean President and dictator, said:
Under the patronage of U.S. imperialists and their agent, the “UN Commission on
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The murderous animosities which existed between the right wing
nationalists in the south, led by Syngman Rhee, and the communists in
the north, under Kim il Sung, led to persistent attempts by the two
sides to destabilise each other through violent incursions across the
parallel. Aided and abetted by their patrons, the Soviets and the
Americans, the two sides waged a vicious civil war through guerrilla
activity which killed 100,000 people before the first shots were
officially fired.20

C. THE HOSTILITIES BEGIN
How did Kim Il Sung arrive at the decision to initiate the attack on
South Korea in June 1950?21 Thousands of Korean Communists had
served in the Chinese Communist Army of Mao Tse-tung (now Mao
Zedong), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), during its successful war
against Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Army. In January 1949 the decision
was made to send a Korean division of twenty-eight thousand (28,000)
men serving in the Chinese Communist forces back to North Korea. In
July 1949 the 166th Division of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,
consisting entirely of Koreans, returned to Korea and became the North
Korean Army’s Sixth (6th) Division. Then, around that same time, the
PLA’s one hundred sixty-fourth (164th) Division, also consisting of
Koreans, entered Korea and became the North Korean Army’s Fifth (5th)
Division. All told, between thirty thousand (30,000) and forty thousand
Korea”, the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique is harshly suppressing not only the left
forces but also the right elements who are discontented with their reactionary rule . . .
The justness of this proposal is clear for all to see. In its proposal the Democratic Front
for the Reunification of the Fatherland demanded the immediate withdrawal of the U.S.
troops from south Korea [sic] and the “UN Commission on Korea,” a tool serving the
aggressive ends of the U.S. imperialists. . . .
KIM IL SUNG, FOR THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA 29-39 (Int’l Publishers
1975). These statements were typical of the North Korean attitude towards the United Nations and its
organs - an attitude that has been modified only slightly over the years and will probably harden under
the dictatorship of Kim Il Jong, Kim Il Sung’s son and successor. Moreover, the Soviet Union prevented
the Republic of Korea from being admitted to membership in the United Nations by the use of the veto.
20. JEFFREY GREY, THE COMMONWEALTH ARMIES AND THE KOREAN WAR: AN ALLIANCE
STUDY 22 (Manchester Univ. Press 1988). For an in-depth study of the status of South Korea and its
internal problems in the late 1940’s see Chong-Sik Lee, The Origins of the Korean War: A Reflection (in
Thomas Hammond, ed. 19xx.).
21. Earlier in 1950, Secretary of State Acheson stated that the Republic of Korea was beyond the
American defensive perimeter in East Asia. This was construed by most nations, including particularly
the Soviet Union, as meaning the United States had no interest in the future of that country and would
not intervene if it were attacked. Nevertheless, on 27 June 1950, two days after the North Korean attack,
President Truman ordered American air and naval forces to support the South Koreans in their
opposition to the attack.
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(40,000) Koreans, all dedicated Communists, were moved to North Korea
from China during 1949.22
The report of the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK)
leaves no doubt that North Korea was the aggressor on June 25, 1950,
despite the self-serving statements of North Korea to the contrary.23
Dozens of books speculate on the origins of the war in Korea, some laying
the blame on Syngman Rhee and the United States and others on Kim Il
Sung, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China.24 All of those
books were written without knowledge of, or before the final publication
of, the three (3) books by Nikita Khrushchev (Khrushchev Remembers;
Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament; and Khrushchev
22. CHEN JIAN, CHINA’S ROAD TO THE KOREAN WAR: THE MAKING OF THE SINO-AMERICAN
CONFRONTATION 110 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994). In February 1950 the remaining 23,000 Koreans in
the Chinese Communist PLA were returned to North Korea and formed the North Korean Army’s
Seventh Division. Id. See also THE DEP’T OF STATE, NORTH KOREA: A CASE STUDY IN THE
TECHNIQUES OF TAKEOVER 117 (1961) which sets forth the following revealing statement:
These divisions were subsequently redesignated the Korean 5th and 6th divisions, turned
in their US equipment [captured upon the flight of Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Army
to Taiwan] and received Russian equipment, and were assigned Korean commanders and
Russian advisers (the latter non-existent during their Manchurian experience). This
contribution was followed up in April 1950 by the shipment of additional Manchurian
Korean troops. All told, Chinese contributions of former Korean Volunteer Corps troops
totaled perhaps 40,000 by June 1950, and accounted for at least one-third of the
spearhead divisions of the north [sic] Korean Army.
Id. A comment made by one author with respect to the members of the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers is
worthy of note. He says: There is reason to believe that many members of the Chinese forces were not
really volunteers at all. They had been coerced into service by threats to their families, or else by the
warning that, if they refused, they would be denied any opportunity to make a living in civilian life.
RICHARD GARRETT, P.O.W. 203 (David & Charles, 1981). The present author believes that few, if any,
of the Chinese were volunteers. If they were Koreans and members of the PLA, they were subject to
being sent to Korea.
23. The UNCOK report stated in part as follows:
Commission’s present view . . . is, first, that judging from actual progress of operations
Northern regime [sic] is carrying out well-planned, concerted, and full-scale invasion of
South Korea, second, that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis
in all sectors of the parallel, and, third, that they were taken completely by surprise as
they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent.
THE DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS 3 (1950). See also H.R. R. No.
81-2495, supra note 10, at 45; JEFFREY GREY, supra note 20, at 22 (citing the Australian military
observers attached to UNCOK).
24. See GLENN D. PAIGE, THE KOREAN PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 35 (Jan F. Triska ed.,
Hoover Inst. 1966). For a presentation of the assumed problems and plans of Syngman Rhee and Kim Il
Sung, written before the books by Khrushchev hereinafter referred to and quoted, see Chapter 5, “A
Hypothesis on the Origins of the Korean Civil War” in ROBERT R. SIMMONS, THE STRAINED ALLIANCE:
PEKING, PIYONGYONG, MOSCOW AND THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN CIVIL WAR (Free Press 1975).
For a further elaboration of the events of this period, see THE DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES POLICY
IN THE KOREAN CRISIS (1950) which contains numerous reports of the United Nations Commission on
Korea (UNCOK), resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council and correspondence
between and statements made by various nations at the time.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 2
LEVIE1.DOC

212

3/26/02 12:29 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

Remembers: The Glastnost Tapes).25 Unquestionably, the most accurate
statements with respect to the events which preceded the conflict between
the two Koreas are the admissions contained in these several
autobiographical volumes of Khrushchev, later Chairman of the Soviet
Union’s Central Committee — the position which Stalin had held for so
many years and at the time of the initiation of hostilities in Korea. The
admissions intentionally made by Khrushchev in these books leave no
doubt that the entire responsibility for the war in Korea falls on Kim Il
Sung, supported by both Stalin and Mao Zedong. Inasmuch as his
statements are admissions against interest and are contrary to the positions
previously asserted by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North
Korea, they should quiet those who continue to insist that South Korea
initiated the hostilities on June 25, 1950. Khrushchev says:
at the end of 1949, Kim Il Sung arrived with his delegation to hold
consultations with Stalin. The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea
with the point of a bayonet. . . . Stalin persuaded Kim Il-sung that he
should think it over, make some calculations, and then come back with a
concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had
worked everything out. He told Stalin he was absolutely certain of success.
I must stress that the war wasn’t Stalin’s idea, but Kim Il-sung’s.26
In a later statement Khrushchev says:
For many years we insisted that the initiative for starting the Korean
war came from South Korea. Some say that there is no need to correct
this version of events, because it would be of advantage only to our
enemies. I’m telling the truth now for the sake of history: it was the
initiative of Comrade Kim Il Sung, and it was supported by Stalin and
many others — in fact, by everybody.27
When Kim II Sung came to Moscow in 1949, I was present. He brought

25. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS (Strobe Talbot ed., Little Brown & Co.
1970) [hereinafter KHRUSHCEV REMEMBERS]; NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE
GLASNOST TAPES (Strobe Talbot ed., Little Brown & Co. 1990) [hereinafter THE GLASNOT TAPES];
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TESTAMENT (Strobe Talbot ed., Little
Brown & Co. 1974) [hereinafter THE LAST TESTAMENT]. See Chapter I of JOHN MERRILL, KOREA: THE
PENINSULAR ORIGIN OF THE WAR (Associated Univ. Press 1989), where many of the theories are set
forth. Only the last of Khrushchev’s books, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE GLASNOST TAPES, was
published after Merrill’s book, in 1990. However, it is probably the most revealing. See also SERGEI N.
GONCHAROV ET AL., UNCERTAIN PARTNERS: STALIN, MAO AND THE KOREAN WAR Chapter 5 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1993).
26. KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, supra note 25, at 367-68.
27. THE GLASNOST TAPES, supra note 25, at 144. The entire sequence of events involving Kim Il
Sung, Stalin, and Mao, and the decision to attack South Korea can be found in KHRUSHCHEV
REMEMBERS, supra note 25, at 367-69.
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with him concrete plans for an attack. I did not participate in all the
detailed discussions that took place. Probably they had talks with the
general staff. I only learned of the final decisions when we all got
together with Stalin in his nearby dacha.28

He elaborates on this statement by adding that when Kim Il Sung
brought his plan for the attack on South Korea to Stalin in Moscow in
1949, Kim was exceedingly optimistic based on the belief that the
Communist cells established in South Korea had enlisted the support of a
vast number of recruits who would rise up and quickly topple the South
Korean government.29 Stalin agreed to furnish him with large quantities of
military supplies but actually kept ultimate control by virtue of his control
of the allocation of petroleum products, one of the major requirements of
modern warfare.30 Stalin withdrew all of the Soviet military advisers from
Korea for fear that one of them might become a prisoner of war.31
However, they later returned to Korea and Soviet airmen not only trained
North Korean pilots, but themselves engaged in combat in the air against
the UNC pilots! Undoubtedly, neither Kim Il Sung, Stalin, or Mao Zedong
had contemplated the military intervention of the United Nations.
Apparently no specific date for the North Korean attack on South

28. THE GLASTNOST TAPES, supra note 25, at 145.
29. A number of rival Communist organizations came into being in South Korea immediately
after the Japanese surrender. KOON WOO NAM, supra note 14, at 71-72.
30. PAIGE, supra note 24, at 35.
31. See PAIGE, supra note 24, at 35-36, in which the following statement appears:
The extent of Chinese involvement in the original decision is problematical. The
assumption of Soviet foreknowledge is based partly upon several revealing facts. First,
there was a tight network of Russian advisers and Soviet-Korean officers that stretched
from the Defense Ministry in Pyongyang to at least the division level of the Korean
People’s Army. Second, during April and May 1950 the Soviet Union provided North
Korea with heavy artillery, tanks, and airplanes far superior to those available to the
Southern forces. Finally, Soviet authorities maintained close control over the Korean
People’s Army through monthly allocations of vital petroleum products. And, on the
other side, it is certain that the war did not result from South Korean initiative, however
much the idea of the forceful unification of Korea might have appealed to President
Rhee.
Id. In KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, supra note 25, at 370, Khrushchev says:
Stalin was partly to blame for the precarious situation which the North Koreans were in.
It’s absolutely incomprehensible to me why he did it, but when Kim Il-sung was
preparing for his march, Stalin called back all our advisors who were with North Korean
divisions and regiments, as well as all the advisors who were serving as consultants and
helping to build up the army. I asked Stalin about this, and he snapped back at me, “It’s
too dangerous to keep our advisors there. They might be taken prisoner. We don’t want
there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this business. It’s Kim Il sung’s
affair.”
Id. See also THE GLASTNOST TAPES, supra note 25, at 146; KOON WOO NAM, supra note 14, at 171 n.2.
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Korea had been set,32 but there are reasons to believe that the attack
ordered by Kim Il Sung took place at a much earlier date than either Stalin
or Mao Zedong had expected.33 The North Korean attack on South Korea
began at 4:00 A.M. local time on June 25, 1950.34 Thereafter, on June 25,
1950 New York time (June 26 Korean time), the Security Council of the
United Nations adopted a resolution which, among other things, contained
the following:
Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of
Korea by forces from North Korea.
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.
I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their armed
forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.
II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
(a) to communicate its fully considered recommendations on the
32. In Chapter 1 of THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR (Monthly Review Press 2d ed.
1969), I.F. Stone argues that the North Korean attack was anticipated by and was no surprise to the
United States military. He is unique in this regard.
33. At one point in THE GLASNOST TAPES, supra note 25, at 145-46, Khrushchev says: “The date
was agreed upon when Kim Il Sung would start his actions to unify Korea. The war began [on June 25,
1950].” Id. Elsewhere he is not so definite. Another author states:
All Koreans were united in their urgent desire for an early reunification. The specific
timing of the June 25 invasion, however, was caused by intense rivalry within the
Korean Workers’ party in the North, combined with appeals from South Korea-based
guerrillas. These pressures may have forced Kim Il-song into war before the date on
which his Soviet mentors and he had probably agreed . . . . Total command of the
invasion date by Russia is questionable. Neither sufficient supplies nor command forces
were in Korea before July, and the Soviet Union did not reenter the Security Council
until August 1. These facts, combined with the sluggish reaction of Russian propaganda
to the war’s initiation, indicates that Moscow did not expect a war on June 25—but
perhaps did in early August.
Robert R. Simmons, The Communist Side: An Exploratory Sketch, in THE KOREAN WAR: A 25-YEAR
PERSPECTIVE 197, 198 (Francis H. Heller ed., Regents Press of Kansas 1977). In a report dated 4
September 1950, the United Nations Commission on Korea, which was in Korea when hostilities began
on 25 June 1950, stated: 202. The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces
of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without
warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan. S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra
note 1, at 39.
34. For an attempt to place much of the blame for the hostilities on the government of South
Korea, see Jon Halliday, The Political Background in KOREA, NORTH AND SOUTH: THE DEEPENING
CRISIS 47 (Gavin McCormack and Mark Selden eds., Monthly Review Press 1978). While it is true that
Rhee’s character left much to be desired, he had been chosen President of the Republic of Korea in an
election conducted under the oversight of United Nations election inspectors; and the residents of South
Korea who fought for the North Koreans were Communists who had remained in South Korea at the
time of the partition. They were far fewer in number than Kim Il Sung had assured Stalin in his attempt
to convince Stalin how easy it would be to overcome South Korea with the innumerable Communists
who would rise and overthrow the Rhee Government, something which never approached reality.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss2/2

10

Levie: A Legal Study of the Korean War
LEVIE1.DOC

2002]

3/26/02 12:29 PM

A LEGAL STUDY OF THE KOREAN WAR

215

situation with the least possible delay;
(b) to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirtyeighth parallel; and
(c) to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this
resolution.
III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United
Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving
assistance to the North Korean authorities.35
On July 7, 1950, after North Korea had disregarded both this
resolution,36 and another of June 27, 1950,37 the Security Council adopted a
resolution calling upon the members of the United Nations to make armed
forces available to a unified command under the United States and
requesting the United States to designate a commander of such forces.38
The United States promptly designated General of the Army Douglas
35. Resolution of the Security Council, June 25, 1950, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (1950)
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 35. Joseph Malik, the representative of the USSR on
the Security Council, was boycotting that organization in an attempt to force the unseating of the
representative of the Republic of China and to replace him with a representative of the People’s Republic
of China. There is also a theory that his actions were taken in order to keep the People’s Republic of
China out of the United Nations! ROBERT R. SIMMONS, THE STRAINED ALLIANCE: PEKING,
PYONGYANG, MOSCOW AND THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN CIVIL WAR 87 (The Free Press 1975). In
his absence the vote for the resolution was nine to nothing (Yugoslavia abstained). Had he been present
he could have vetoed the resolution. He later challenged the validity of the Resolution because it had not
received the affirmative votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the USSR having
been absent and the Chinese vote having been cast by the Republic of China, rather than by the People’s
Democratic Republic of China. U.N. Doc. S/1517, (1950). The United States issued a press release
pointing out the numerous occasions upon which an abstention by a permanent member of the Security
Council had not been considered to be a veto and did not even deign to attempt to justify the presence of
the Republic of China in the Chinese seat on the Security Council. THE DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED
STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS 61-62 (1950).
36. “In two days they had captured Seoul, and then inaugurated a reign of terror which ended in
the death of thousands of South Koreans.” EDWIN P. HOYT, ON TO THE YALU 135 (Military Heritage
Press, 1984).
37. Resolution of the Security Council, June 27, 1950, S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1511 (1950) reprinted in UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS, supra note 36, at 24. This
Resolution recommended that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and
security in the area.” Id.
38. Resolution of the Security Council, July 7, 1950, S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1588
(1950) reprinted in UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE KOREAN CRISIS, supra note 36, at 66-67.
Eventually, sixteen nations (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United
Kingdom, and the United States) responded to the United Nations request and volunteered armed force
to the United Nations. In addition, Denmark, Italy, India, Norway, and Sweden furnished medical units.
See DAVID REES, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR (Saint Martin’s Press 1964). For a full discussion of the
political aspects of the Korean Conflict and the overall part played by the United Nations therein, see
MARC FRANKENSTEIN, L’ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES DEVANT LE CONFLIT COREEN (Editions
A. Pedone 1952) and Oberson Blaise, Le CICR et la Guerre de Coree” : Une Tache Impossible (1986).
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MacArthur, then the post-World War II Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers in Japan, and Commander-in-Chief of the Far East
Command of the United States, located in Tokyo, as the Commander-inChief of the unified command, which received the title of the United
Nations Command (hereinafter referred to as the UNC). It is with this lastnamed Command that we will be primarily concerned, as it was this
Command that General MacArthur designated as the Detaining Power for
captured North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners of war.
In every conflict there are two facets to the treatment of prisoners of
war: (1) the treatment of your own personnel captured by the enemy; and
(2) your treatment of enemy personnel whom you have captured.
Inasmuch as the second facet listed above does not have the patriotic
appeal that the first one does, and is really of minor interest to the average
person, it is rarely discussed. It is here proposed to discuss and compare
both facets of the problem as they arose in the hostilities in Korea (19501953); and to demonstrate the effect of the different attitudes on the
armistice negotiations. In discussing this matter it must be realized that
when hostilities erupted with the North Korean invasion of South Korea39
neither side was a Party to the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War,40 that only Chile, Czechoslovakia, India,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia were already Parties
to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War,41 and that the 1949 Geneva Convention was not even in force.42
Nevertheless, on June 26, 1950, the day after the outbreak of hostilities, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter referred to as the
ICRC) sent a message to the two parties to the conflict calling their
attention to the 1929 Convention and to Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. Article 3 of each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is

39. The North Koreans contended, and probably still contend for propaganda purposes, that the
South Koreans initiated the attack and the North Koreans were, in a few hours, able to stop the attack and
reverse the direction of armed movement from north to south. As we have seen, even Khrushchev has
admitted the falsity of that claim. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Moreover, a report of
the United Nations Commission on Korea a neutral international Commission that was in Korea at the
time, specifically found the “invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the
North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without
warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan.” Document No. 74, supra
note 1, at 39.
40. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
41. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
42. 35 Int’l Rev. of the Red Cross 114 (No. 304 1995). The Convention did not enter into force
until 21 October 1950 (Id. at 112).
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identical. It is concerned with non-international conflicts which was, of
course, the status of the hostilities on June 26, 1950.43 When the number of
parties to the fighting escalated as a result of the action of the Security
Council of the United Nations, notes were sent by the ICRC to all of the
participants offering its services and once again calling attention to the
1929 Geneva Convention and to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. On
July 5, the United States replied that it would be guided by the
humanitarian principles of the Conventions.44 Similar commitments were
made by the other States which had contributed armed forces to the United
Nations Command.45 On July 7, 1950 South Korea agreed to be bound by
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.46 On July 15, 1950 the Secretary-General
of the United Nations advised the ICRC that he had received a telegram
from North Korea which stated that it was “strictly abiding by principles of
Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of War.”47 Thus, all of the
parties to the conflict were committed to compliance with the then current
humanitarian provisions of the international law of war pertaining to the
protection of prisoners of war.48 The extent to which these commitments
were complied with by each side will be the major theme of this study.

43. 1 CONFLIT DE COREE: RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS 4, 6 (International Committee of the Red
Cross, 1952) Article 3 is sometimes referred to as a “Mini Convention” as it contained the only
provisions of those Conventions concerned with non-international hostilities, a subject that international
Diplomatic Conventions had previously avoided. In order to ensure delivery to North Korea, the ICRC
also sent the message to Moscow with a request that it be forwarded to North Korea. Id. at 3. The ICRC
continued this practice until 22 August 1050 when it was advised by the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in
Switzerland that the post and telegraph to North Korea were functioning normally. Id. at 49.
44. 1 CONFLIT DE COREE, supra note 43, at 13. When the hostilities in Korea commenced, the
treatment of prisoners of war by the United States Army was governed by Technical Manual 19-500,
Enemy Prisoners of War, which had been issued in October 1944 during the course of World War II.
45. 1 CONFLIT DE COREE, supra note 43: Great Britain, at 16; Netherlands, loc. cit.; Canada, Id. at
19.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Note that the message was sent by North Korea to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, not to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Throughout the
hostilities, even when the Armistice was about to be signed, North Korea viewed the ICRC as an arm of
the United Nations Command, and not as a neutral! So, too, did the People’s Republic of China and,
therefore, the Chinese Red Cross, which, as in all Communist countries, was only an agency of the
Government. (for purposes of simplicity, the so-called Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers (who were, in fact,
complete field armies of the People’s Republic of China) are referred to herein as the “Chinese
Communists”).
48 Being committed to compliance and actual compliance are, unfortunately, two different
things insofar as the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists were concerned. See PHILIP D.
CHINNERY, KOREAN ATROCITY: FORGOTTEN WAR CRIMES, 1950-1953 (Naval Institute Press
2000).
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D. The International Committee of the Red Cross
Communist countries have always been allergic to the idea of having
neutral States or organizations or international organizations monitor the
performance of their international obligations. Both North Korea and the
Peoples’ Republic of China suffer from a major case of that allergy.49 A
question which has long gone unanswered is why countries like the
Peoples’ Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, etc. rarely, if ever,
designate or accept Protecting Powers pursuant to Article 8 of the 1949
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention and steadfastly refuse to permit the
International Committee of the Red Cross to perform the functions
allocated to it by Article 9 of that Convention, availing themselves of the
provision of that Article which makes the activities of the ICRC “subject to
the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned.” If there is any answer
to that question other than the fact that those countries intend to, and do,
mistreat prisoners of war, have no intention of complying with the
provisions of the Convention, and do not desire to have representatives of
neutral or international agencies witness their violations of the law of war,
they have never attempted to make such answer known.50
Beginning on the day after the outbreak of hostilities, and
continuously thereafter, the ICRC fruitlessly sought permission, first from
North Korea, later from Communist China, and from both at the same time,
for its delegates to enter North Korea and to perform their usual function of
visiting prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals and reporting to the Detaining
Power any deficiencies which they find in the treatment that the prisoners
of war are receiving. Rather than appear to recognize the powers conferred
on the International Committee of the Red Cross by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, North Korea responded to the ICRC telegram of June 26,
1950 and to a similar telegram from the Secretary-General of the United
Nations sent on July 12, 1950, with the telegam to the latter set forth
above.51 For the next two and one-half (2 ½) years the ICRC continued,
without success, its efforts to obtain permission to perform the functions
conferred on it by the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.52 Eventually,
49. In its slow move towards capitalism, and its desire to maintain and increase its position in the
markets of the capitalist countries, the Peoples’ Republic of China is, to some extent, loosening these
chains. The same cannot be said for North Korea despite its economic chaos.
50. For a disheartening example of the mistreatment of prisoners of war (and civilians) by
members of the North Korean army, a country that advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations
it was strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of War, see JOHN
TOLAND, IN MORTAL COMBAT: KOREA, 1950-1953 255-264 (William Morrow & Co. 1991).
51. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
52. In addition to a denial of the right of Delegates of the ICRC to visit prisoner-of-war camps
maintained first by the North Koreans and then by the Chinese Communists, neither of the latter
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despite the fact that the ICRC had sent them copies of well over one
hundred reports on the results of the inspection visits of its Delegates to
UNC prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals, many with critical findings
which they caused to be rectified, the Communists indicated their belief
that the ICRC was an arm of the UNC by proposing that “joint
Commissions should be set up to visit prisoner of war camps after an
armistice had been signed. The Commission would be composed of
representatives of the North Korean Red Cross, the Chinese Red Cross and
the International Committee.”53 Not unnaturally, the ICRC rejected this
proposal which seemed to, and was undoudtedly intended to, indicate that
the ICRC was a creature of the UNC, rather than an impartial international
relief organization.
Probably among the more important provisions of both the 1929 and
the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War are those relating to the functions of the Protecting Powers and of the
ICRC.54 These organs are the only means by which a party to the
hostilities can be assured that members of its armed forces who have been
captured are receiving the humanitarian treatment mandated by
international law. Inasmuch as there were no Protecting Powers during the
hostilities in Korea, all of these functions fell upon the ICRC. The ICRC
immediately instructed its Hong Kong delegate, Frederick Bieri, to proceed
to Tokyo and South Korea in order to perform the humanitarian functions
normally performed by the ICRC, particularly in the absence of a
Protecting Power.55 Bieri, and his successors, were given full access to all
UNC prisoner-of-war installations.56 However, the Communists, both the
complied with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention contained in Articles 122125, particularly in Article 123 concerning the Central Prisoners of War Agency charged with collecting
and receiving information concerning prisoners of war. Early in the hostilities the North Koreans
submitted two lists of prisoners of war, with a total of 110 names. They then discontinued the practice,
probably on the theory that lack of information would cause discontent among the families of those men
missing in action who might be prisoners of war or might be dead. On the other hand, the UNC provided
the Central Agency with 178,000 names, 157,000 of North Koreans and 21,000 of Chinese Communists.
See Summary Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, XVIII International Red Cross
Conference, Toronto. July-August 1953, at 72-73.
53. International Review of the Red Cross, March 1952, Vol. V, No. 3, at 54. “The Committee felt
that the proposal seemed to imply that it could be considered as the United Nations Red Cross.”
54. See The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
supra note 41, Art. 8, 9, and 10.
55. 1 Conflit de Coree, supra note 43, at 8-9.
56. On December 20, 1952 the British Consulate General in Geneva sent the following letter
to the British Foreign Office in London:
** I am sending you herewith by Air Bag two copies, one in French and the other in
English of all the reports on P.O.W. Camp visits in South Korea made by the delegates
of the International Committee of the Red Cross covering the period July 26, 1950 to
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North Koreans at that time and the Chinese Communists later, refused to
permit the ICRC to function in their prisoner-of-war camps. Hence, there
was no outside neutral organization to oversee the manner in which the
UNC prisoners of war were treated in those camps.57 For this information
we must, therefore, rely on other sources, such as the interrogation of posthostilities repatriated prisoners of war.58
E. The People’s Republic of China Joins the War
The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) was unable to arrest the
southward move of the North Korean Army. The troops of the United
States who were first brought to Korea to reinforce them were garrison
troops from Japan, none of them seasoned veterans. However, these
combined South Korean and United States troops did succeed in stopping
the North Koreans at the Naktong River, forming the Pusan Perimeter, and
April 7, 1952.
I have obtained these two versions of the reports from Monsieur de Traz Assistant
Executive Director of the I.C.R.C. who informs me that the French version has been
communicated regularly and exclusively to the North Korean Authorities. The English
version has also been communicated regularly to the United States Government (Unified
Command), the South Korean authorities and the European office of the United Nations.
British Records Office, Fk 1553/128.
57. Not even their own Communist Red Cross Societies were permitted access to their prisonerof-war installations. In any event, in view of the fact that both of these Red Cross Societies were merely
adjuncts of their Governments, they would have accomplished little had they been permitted to perform
the normal Red Cross functions in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the North Koreans and later
by the Chinese Communists (support for this latter statement will readily be found by reading FACTS
CONCERNING THE ATROCITIES OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES ON PRISONERS OF WAR (Red Cross Society
of China 1953) and REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF MEDICAL ATROCITIES AND MALPRACTICES
COMMITTED BY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN KOREA ON SICK AND WOUNDED CHINESE PEOPLE’S
VOLUNTEERS PRISONERS OF WAR, (Red Cross Society of China 1953) both post-hostilities products of
the Red Cross Society of China, each of which is 5% fact and 95% propaganda.) Both Societies refused
even to accept relief food and medical equipment offered to them by the ICRC and others for the
prisoners of war held by their governments.
58. The following testimony was given by PFC John E. Martin on 2 December 1953 during the
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
pursuant to S. Res. 40, Part I, 2 December 1953 (hereinafter cited as Hearings):
They marched us into Chenju about 3 miles away and we met seven more prisoners
there. We were met by a man wearing a Red Cross band that he claimed to be a member
of the International Red Cross and he said that we would receive shelter and medical
care and food.
We had 10 men then. They brought in two wounded men a little while later. One
was walking. The other one we had to bring in on the litter. About 5 o’clock that
evening the Red Cross, the so-called Red Cross man, came back again and gave us all 6
or 5 little rice cookies about that big around.
Part I, at 28-29. This was, of course, a complete fraud as no member of the ICRC was ever granted
access to UNC prisoners of war.
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thus retaining control of the last port in South Korea through which troops
and supplies could reach the defenders of that country.59
Following the amphibious landing of UNC combat troops at Inchon,
on the west coast of South Korea, on September 15, 1950, accompanied by
a massive UNC attack from the Pusan Perimeter, the North Korean Army
was decimated. Thousands upon thousands of its troops were taken
prisoner as they were caught in the trap between the UNC troops moving
north from the Pusan Perimeter and those moving east and south from
Inchon.60 The UNC then began moving north,61 crossing the 38th parallel
and occupying Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. When the North
Korean defeat appeared inevitable, Mao Zedong sent Zhou Enlai to inform
Stalin that the Chinese Communists had mobilized an army of 500,000 and
were prepared to assist the North Koreans.62 In October 1950, several
Chinese Communist field armies crossed the Yalu and entered the fray.63
Although they were actually field armies of Communist China (now the
People’s Republic of China), long since completely organized, equipped,
trained, and supplied by the Communist government of China, and acting
pursuant to orders emanating from Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist
dictator, they adopted and maintained the fiction that they were merely
volunteers and insisted on being referred to as the Chinese People’s
59. One author of this period has written that [f]or some three weeks [in June-July 1950] the
Americans faced disaster after disaster; many of the wounded were murdered in cold blood by the enemy
and prisoners of war were bayonetted by their captors in a manner reminiscent of the Japanese during
World War II. PETER GASTON, THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL: THE BRITISH IN KOREA 4-5, (A.D.
Hamilton, 1976)
60. In MARRHEW B. RIDGWAY, THE KOREAN WAR 31 (Doubleday & Co. 1967), General
Matthew Ridgway says:
On September 27, [1950], men of the 1st Cavalry Division, rolling northward, near
Suwon, met forward elements of the U.S, 7th Division striking south. The Jaws of the
trap had been closed. Now the NKPA began to disintegrate, with tens of thousands of its
men flowing into the prisoner-of-war cages hastily erected by the Eighth Army and the
X Corps.
Id. On the same subject, another author states that “In August 1950 the UN held fewer than 1,000
POWs. But by November, with the Inchon invasion and the rapid drive into North Korea, the total rose
to more than 130,000.” JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WAR 592 (McGrawHill 1982).
61. On October 1, 1950, ROKA troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. On October 2, 1950
Chou En-lai advised the Indian Ambassador that if troops of the United States entered North Korea,
China would intervene in the war. Five days later, on 7 October 1950, the U.S. First Cavalry Division
crossed the 38th parallel. On 16 October 1950 the first Chinese Communist Volunteers crossed the Yalu
and entered North Korea. PROJECT RAND, supra note 18, at 93-94.
62. See THE GLASTNOST TAPES, supra note 25, at 145-47.
63. “Between mid-October and November 1, from 180,000 to 228,000 crack Fourth Field Army
troops crossed into North Korea.” PROJECT RAND, supra, note 18, at 118. For further data on how the
decision was made for China to intervene, see Nikita Khrushchev, KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS, supra
note 25, at 371-72.
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Volunteers (CPV).64 They immediately became, and remained, the main
enemy of the UNC65 and took over the management of UNC prisoners of
war from the North Koreans.66 By the end of the year they had driven the
UNC forces back across the 38th parallel and on January 1, 1951, they had
retaken Seoul. Their victories also created a problem for the UNC as to
what it should do with the thousands of prisoners of war which it held and
who, it appeared, would be liberated by the Chinese in their inexorable
move south.67
F. The End of Hostilities - The Armistice Negotiations
On April 11, 1951, General MacArthur was relieved of his command
of the United Nations Command and was succeeded by General Matthew
B. Ridgway, former commander of the UNC fighting force in Korea.68
Sometime thereafter the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations made a
64. On several occasions during the armistice negotiations the Chinese representative
objected violently to being referred to as the “Chinese Communists” and would insist on the fiction
that all of the Chinese were volunteers and should be referred to as the “Chinese People’s
Volunteers”.
65. “Russia lost its unique position as the only important Communist ally of North Korea.”
PAIGE, supra note 24, at 36.
66. On 1 February 1951 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution in
which it found that the People’s Republic of China “has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.” S. DOC.
NO. 83-74, supra note 1, at 55. One author has stated “the Chinese, when they joined the fray from
October 1950, came from the regime which would soon impress upon the world its detachment from
prevailing norms of international behavior.” GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, 352 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1994).
67. The following statement appears in MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, supra note 60, at 205-06:
As early as January 6, 1951, I became sufficiently concerned with the problems of
what to do about the prisoners of war in our custody to include the subject in my letter to
General MacArthur. What we were faced with and what had me worried, was the
presence close to the fighting zone of some 140,000 prisoners of war whom we had to
feed, water, guard, and care for. It took a substantial fraction (which we could ill spare)
of our armed forces just to guard the compounds and it took much of our scanty
transportation to carry supplies to feed and clothe and house them. If we had to
withdraw from the peninsula, there was their removal to fret about. If we held on, a
substantial part of our own logistic effort would have to go to their subsistence, medical
care, clothing, even their drinking water.
MacArthur’s reply was to inform me he had already recommended the removal of
the prisoners to the United States. They could not be brought to Japan, not only because
their presence was likely to enrage the populace but because their establishment there
might provoke a charge of Japanese belligerency. No immediate decision on removal
was forthcoming from Washington.
Id. He does not mention that consideration was also given to moving the POWs to the Ryukyu Islands.
GOULDEN, supra note 60, at 593 (stating the ultimate decision was to move the POWs to the Korean
island of Koje-do).
68. General Ridgway was succeeded by General James Van Fleet as the commander of the UNC
forces in Korea.
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radio address in which he indicated that there was no reason why the
hostilities in Korea could not be brought to an end. The United Nations
Command interpreted this as an indication of a desire and willingness on
the part of the Communists to end the fighting and an agreement was
reached by the military commanders for liaison officers to meet and make
the necessary arrangements for discussions at a higher level.
Negotiations for an armistice began at Kaesong on July 10, 1951.
Shortly thereafter, the negotiations were moved to Panmunjom at the
insistence of the UNC because Kaesong, which had been between the two
lines at the time of the negotiations of the liaison officers, had been
occupied by the Communists and they presumed to dictate who could enter
the area,69 while Panmunjom was located in a zone between territories
occupied by the two sides. It was declared a neutral zone as were Kaesong
(the Communist Armistice Delegation headquarters),70 Munsan-ni (the
UNC Armistice Delegation headquarters), and the roads leading from each
Delegation headquarters to Panmunjom.
It took two (2) weeks to agree on an agenda, principally because the
Communists insisted on including in the agenda an item calling for the
withdrawal from Korea on both sides of the 38th parallel of all non-Korean
armed forces, a matter beyond the authority of the UNC Delegation. As a
compromise, the UNC agreed to an item proposed by the Communists by
which the military commanders would recommend to their governments
that a political conference be held within three months from the end of
hostilities.
The negotiations continued for almost a year, with an agreement
being reached on all items of the agenda except that relating to prisoners of
war, because the UNC insisted on “voluntary repatriation,” i.e., that every
prisoner of war could make a personal determination as to whether he
would return to the country in whose armed forces he had been serving at
the time of his capture.71
69. They also required the UNC convoy to fly white flags, ostensibly for identification purposes,
but actually in order to let the dozens of Communist cameramen take pictures which appeared to indicate
that the UNC was coming to the Communists on bended knees to secure an end of the hostilities.
70. On numerous occasions the Communists would call the UNC Delegation headquarters,
usually at night, to complain of a violation of their neutral zone. It is probable that UNC pilots did, on
occasion, inadvertently overfly the Communist headquarters. On one occasion they contended that a
UNC plane had dropped a bomb which had failed to explode. I was the liaison officer sent to
investigate, accompanied by an Air Force officer. When shown the “bomb”, my Air Force assistant
whispered in my ear that it was actually a belly tank which was so rusty that it had probably been lying
in its present position for months!
71. The UNC was well aware of the fact that early in the course of the hostilities, when the North
Koreans had occupied all of the Korean peninsula north of the Pusan Perimeter, they had conscripted
every South Korean male of military age, many of whom had subsequently surrendered to or been
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In May 1952 the armistice discussions were adjourned indefinitely on
the issue of “voluntary repatriation,” and the UNC Armistice Delegation
and Staff returned to their normal assignments, remaining available should
the need arise.72 Then , on March 5, 1953, Stalin died and the Soviet
leaders became more interested in internal politics than in the hostilities in
Korea. The first indication of a change in attitude on the part of the
Communists in Korea was their agreement, announced on March 28, 1953,
to the prior UNC proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners
of war. As we shall see, the hostilities ended in an Armistice Agreement
signed at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953.73 In a speech delivered on August
5, 1953, Kim Il Sung, still the President (and dictator) of North Korea, said:
“Comrades, the armistice signifies a great victory for us.”74 However, Kim
completely ignored the fact that while North Korea had gained a small
amount of territory below the 38th Parallel in the western part of Korea,
South Korea had gained a large amount of territory north of the 38th
Parallel in the central and eastern parts of the peninsula; and, more
important, the Republic of Korea had not been absorbed into North Korea,
as had been the basic purpose of the hostilities, but remained a strong,
independent nation. Moreover, thousands of Korean and Chinese prisoners
of war had publicly rejected life under Communism, certainly not much
evidence of a “great victory” for that way of life! Kim’s statement can
only be construed as an attempt to justify the mistake he had made in
embarking on the war in the belief that the South Korean Communists
would rise up and overthrow the government of South Korea and that the
North Korean troops would then be able to occupy all of the territory of
South Korea practically without opposition before the United States and
the United Nations would be in a position to intervene — if, indeed, they
did decide to intervene — a belief which he had used to convince Stalin
and Mao to assist him in his undertaking for the glory of Communism in
the expectation of extending its jurisdiction over millions of people — and
all under Kim’s control!

captured by the UNC, and that the great majority of these individuals had no desire to be “repatriated” to
North Korea. In addition, it was known that there were many Chinese prisoners of war who had been
conscripted into the Chinese Communist army upon the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and who had no
desire to be repatriated to Communist China.
72. The author remained at Munsan-ni as the sole representative of the UNC Armistice Delegation
and Staff in order to be available to receive any messages that might emanate from the Communist
Armistice Delegation. However, he, too, was ordered back to Tokyo late in June 1952.
73. It is important to bear in mind that an armistice does not end a war, it merely suspends
hostilities. See Howard S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT’L L.
880, 884 (1956).
74. KIM IL SUNG, supra note 19, at 36. Similar statements appear throughout his speech.
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In 1996 North Korea denounced the Armistice Agreement. What its
reason was for this action has never been explained. It is certainly in no
condition to undertake another war, particularly as it cannot be assured of
either Chinese or Russian support – and it is far from self-supporting.
Moreover, in recent years there were efforts to convene a conference to be
held in Geneva with representatives of the Republic of Korea, the United
States, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace. This
author was far from sanguine that such an event would arrive at a
meaningful conclusion despite North Korea’s extremely poor economic
condition and its lack of adequate food even to feed its own population.
The conference did, in fact, accomplish nothing. Since then there have
been a number of incidents which demonstrate clearly that the hostilities
between the two Koreas continue to exist, although at the moment they are
on a restricted scale. How long that situation will continue to exist before it
bursts into flames only Kim Il Jong (Kim Il Song’s son and successor) and
his advisors know!
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